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ABSTRACT 
While the technology underlying speech interfaces has 
improved in recent years, our understanding of the human 
side of speech interactions remains limited. This paper 
provides new insight on one important human aspect of 
speech interactions: the sense of agency - defined as the 
experience of controlling one’s own actions and their 
outcomes. Two experiments are described. In each case a 
voice command is compared with keyboard input. Agency 
is measured using an implicit metric: intentional binding. In 
both experiments we find that participants’ sense of agency 
is significantly reduced for voice commands as compared to 
keyboard input. This finding presents a fundamental 
challenge for the design of effective speech interfaces. We 
reflect on this finding and, based on current theory in HCI 
and cognitive neuroscience, offer possible explanations for 
the reduced sense of agency observed in speech interfaces. 
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INTRODUCTION 
At ACM CHI 2014 Aylett et al. discussed the ups and 
downs of the relationship between HCI research and speech 
technology [1]. They argue that disillusionment within the 
HCI community with speech interfaces is partly due to a 
mismatch of expectations. Speech technologists have often 
presented speech interfaces as providing a “natural means 
of communication”, whereas in reality technical limitations 
such as high error rates, recognition latency and issues with 
ambient noise can reduce their effectiveness. Aylett et al. 
make a strong case for significant progress in tackling these 
limitations. However, they also recognise that substantial 
non-technical challenges remain. For example, 
Shneiderman has argued that “speech is slow for presenting 
information, is transient and therefore difficult to review or 
edit, and interferes significantly with other cognitive tasks” 
[9]. He further argues that our understanding of the human 
side of speech interactions is insufficient and that there is a 
need to address design challenges in speech interfaces by 
increasing this understanding. 
This paper provides new insight on one important aspect of 
the human side of speech interactions: the sense of agency. 
We focus on the sense of agency when interacting with 
voice command interfaces. The sense of agency can be 
defined as the experience of controlling one’s own actions 
and, through this control, affecting the external world [2]. It 
is a crosscutting experience that links to concepts such as 
free will, causality and responsibility. In the context of HCI 
the importance of agency is illustrated by Shneiderman’s 7th 
rule for interface design, which recommends that designers 
strive to create interfaces that “support an internal locus of 
control” [10]. This is based on the observation that users 
“strongly desire the sense that they are in charge of the 
system and that the system responds to their actions”. 
Agency has been extensively studied in the field of 
cognitive neuroscience [4]. More recently Coyle et al. have 
applied methods developed in cognitive neuroscience to 
investigate peoples’ sense of agency when interacting with 
computers [2]. They have shown, for example, that on-body 
interfaces can engender a greater sense of agency than 
keyboard interactions. A more detailed review of early HCI 
research on the sense of agency is also available in [6]. In 
this paper we describe two experiments comparing peoples’ 
sense of agency in voice command and keyboard interfaces. 
Our aim is to determine if the sense of agency when 
interacting with speech interfaces is different to that 
experienced in more traditional input methods. Our results 
lead us to conclude that people experience less control over 
their environment when interacting via speech interfaces. 
INTENTIONAL BINDING 
Both of our experiments use intentional binding as an 
implicit metric for the sense of agency. Intentional binding 
is the name given to a temporal phenomenon that occurs 
when a person takes a voluntary action that causes an 
outcome [3]. In this case actions are perceived to happen 
later than they actually did, while outcomes are perceived 
as happening earlier. The overall effect is a binding, 
whereby the interval between an action and its effect is 
perceived as shorter than is actually the case (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: The intentional binding effect.  
Intentional binding = action binding + outcome binding. 
Research has shown that for binding to occur, actions must 
be intentional and must lead to an outcome. Involuntary or 
unintended actions have the opposite effect, with the 
interval between actions and outcomes perceived as longer 
than the actual interval. Overall, there is a strong scientific 
consensus that intentional binding is a robust implicit 
metric for the sense of agency [3, 8]. Larger binding values 
correlate to a greater sense of agency. Other methods to 
assess agency do exist, e.g. fMRI studies or self-report 
questionnaires. Binding studies cost significantly less than 
fMRI studies, are more practical in most contexts, and 
provide an implicit means to investigate agency. A key 
advantage of the binding measure is its implicit nature, 
sidestepping issues with explicit measures (e.g. 
questionnaires) such as demand effects and introspection. 
EXPERIMENT 1  
This experiment compared participants’ sense of agency for 
two action conditions: a key press and a voice command. 
Previous research has shown that the predictability of 
action-outcome relationships can have an impact on the 
sense of agency [8]. In order to remove voice recognition 
errors as a potential confound we required the recognizer to 
have a very low error rate. We implemented our voice 
interface using Sphinx 4 [11], an open source, hidden 
Markov model-based recognition system, with continuous 
recognition capabilities. Our task required recognition of 
just one word, “Go”, so our grammar file contained only 
this word. This approach proved effective. In the study 
there was no block of trials with more than 4 errors (less 
than 10% error rate). Previous work shows that an error rate 
below 10% is unlikely to cause a confound [8]. 
Procedure 
Coyle et al. [2] describe two methods for measuring 
participants’ temporal perception in binding experiments: 
the Libet Clock and interval estimation methods. The Libet 
clock method offers a more detailed insight into the agentic 
experience and is the one applied here. Participants report 
their perception of time by recording the position of the 
hand on a clock that rotates at a rate of one rotation every 
2560ms. In order to measure intentional binding, baseline 
and operant measures are taken for both actions and 
outcomes. In the operant blocks actions cause an outcome. 
For baseline blocks only an action or an outcome occur. 
Table 1 shows the full set of measures taken and the 
calculations used for intentional binding. 
A within-subjects design was used, with one independent 
variable: action modality - voice command or key press. 
Figure 1 illustrates the procedure for individual trials. 
Participants watched a screen showing a Libet clock and 
used a footswitch to initiate trials. Once initiated, the clock 
hand started to rotate. For key press trials, participants 
pressed the ‘enter’ key on the keyboard as an action. For the 
voice command condition, participants said the word ‘Go’. 
We used the end of the utterance as the point of action in 
the voice condition. In both conditions participants were 
asked to make an action whenever they were ready. 
As is common in intentional binding experiments the 
outcome used in our experiment was a tone. A fixed action-
outcome interval of 500ms was used to ensure sufficient 
time for word recognition by the voice recognizer. This is a 
slightly longer interval than is typically used in intentional 
binding experiments, but it is well within the interval range 
for which binding is expected [8].  
Blocks of trials were completed for each input condition as 
outlined in Table 1. Each block included 40 trials, with 
mean values used to determine intentional binding using the 
calculations shown in Table 1. This resulted in a total of 
320 trials per participant. The blocks for each condition 
were grouped together and the order of the input conditions 
was alternated for odd and even numbered participants. The  
 
Figure 2: The procedure for trials in Experiment 1. 
Measurement Blocks 
Block Type Action Outcome Participant report 
Action Baseline Key-Press or 
Voice command 
None Perceived time of 
action 
Action Operant Key-Press or 
Voice command 
Tone Perceived time of 
action 
Tone Baseline None Tone Perceived time of 
outcome 
Tone Operant Key-Press or 
Voice command 
Tone Perceived time of 
outcome 
Intentional Binding Calculations 
Action Baseline Error = actual time – perceived time 
Action Operant Error = actual time – perceived time 
Outcome Baseline Error = actual time – perceived time 
Outcome Operant Error = actual time – perceived time 
Action Binding = Action Operant Error - Action Baseline Error 
Outcome Binding = Outcome Baseline Error - Outcome Operant Error 
Total Binding = Action Binding + Outcome Binding 
Table 1. The temporal measurements, in milliseconds, and 
calculations used to estimate intentional binding.  
 Action    
binding 
Outcome 
binding 
Total         
binding 
Button 23.00ms 
(16.25ms) 
22.57ms 
(34.28ms) 
45.56ms 
(36.47ms) 
Voice 
command 
40.12ms 
(64.10ms) 
5.78ms 
(39.16ms) 
45.90ms 
(93.80ms) 
 
Table 2: the mean action, outcome and total binding times for 
Experiment 1. Standard deviations in brackets. 
order of the blocks was randomised within the input 
conditions, but was balanced for odd and even participants.  
Participants 
14 participants, all right-handed and aged 20-40, took part. 
All had normal or corrected to normal vision and hearing. 
The study was approved by the University of Bristol ethics 
committee. All participants gave written, informed consent 
and received a £15 retail voucher for participating. 
Results 
Table 2 shows the mean action, outcome and total binding 
values for the key press and voice command conditions 
across 14 participants. The full operant and baseline 
measures and calculations for these binding values are 
included in Appendix 1 (see online auxiliary materials). To 
test if intentional binding occurred in either the key press or 
voice condition, we conducted separate 2x2 repeated 
measures analysis of variance on participants’ perceived 
times for each input modality, with factors event (action vs. 
outcome) and context (operant vs. baseline). For the key 
press condition there was significant intentional binding: 
F(1,13)=20.293, p<.001. For the verbal command we did 
not find significant binding: F(1,13)=3.112, p<.101.  
Analysis 
Intentional binding is the shift of both the perceived action 
and outcome towards one another. This binding was present 
for the key-press condition, with a binding value consistent 
with prior literature. Binding was not found for the voice 
command. The mean action and outcome binding for the 
speech interface indicate that insufficient outcome binding 
occurred to elicit a significant overall binding effect. 
Further analysis of the temporal measures in the voice 
condition revealed an important issue. Participants’ action 
baseline error (see online Appendix) indicates that they 
perceived their speech action occurring 316ms before the 
point recorded by the computer. This is an unusually large 
baseline error for action estimation. Subsequent recordings 
suggest that saying the word “Go” takes ~300ms. Taken 
together this suggests that our participants perceived their 
speech actions as occurring at the beginning of their 
utterance, rather than at the end – the point we chose as the 
 Action    
binding 
Outcome 
binding 
Total         
binding 
Button 47.37ms 
(122.34ms) 
47.75ms 
(117.11ms) 
94.12ms 
(176.17ms) 
Voice 
command 
-5.70ms 
(94.90ms) 
-4.36ms 
(34.51ms) 
-10.06ms 
(95.44ms) 
 
 
Table 3: the mean action, outcome and total binding times for 
Experiment 2. Standard deviations in brackets.  
action reference point for the computer. In effect this means 
the action-outcome interval for the voice command was 
~800ms, rather than the 500ms we intended. While 
intentional binding has been observed at intervals of 800ms, 
it is less likely than at 500ms [8]. It is thus possible that a 
longer action-outcome interval may explain the absence of 
binding in the voice condition. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
To address our concerns with Experiment 1, a second 
experiment was conducted with two alterations. First, the 
‘StartSpeech’ signal (a built-in component in Sphinx4 
which indicates that speech has started) was used as the 
point of speech actions. This change addressed our 
observation in Experiment 1 that participants perceived 
their actions as occurring at the start of the utterance. 
Second, to address the possibility that a longer 
action/outcome interval resulted in no intentional binding 
for the speech condition, the action/outcome interval was 
shortened to 300ms. Aside from these changes the 
procedure was the same as Experiment 1. 
Participants 
Again we had 14 participants; all right-handed, aged 20-40, 
with normal or corrected to normal vision and hearing. The 
university ethics committee approved the study and 
participants received a £15 retail voucher. One participant 
was excluded from our analysis due to an equipment fault. 
Results 
Table 3 shows the mean action, outcome and total binding 
effects for the key press and voice command conditions. To 
test whether intentional binding was occurring, we again 
conducted separate 2x2 repeated measures analysis of 
variance tests on participants’ perceived times for each 
input modality, with factors of event (action vs. tone) and 
context (operant vs. baseline). For the key press condition 
there was a trend toward significant intentional binding: 
F(1,12)=3.496, p< .086. Although the mean binding scores 
where higher than in Experiment 1, a large variance 
between participants rendered the score insignificant. For 
the verbal command we did not find significant binding: 
F(1,12)=.144, p< .711. 
Analysis  
Experiment 2 addressed a potential reason for the absence 
of intentional binding for voice commands in Experiment 1. 
We found that these alterations did not elicit intentional 
binding for voice commands. The key press condition 
showed a trend towards significance and given a larger 
sample size would likely be consistent with Experiment 1 
and a wealth of prior intentional binding literature. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Our results suggest that intentional binding does not occur 
for voice command interfaces. This in turn suggests that the 
sense of agency is lower for voice commands than for input 
techniques such as a keyboard. We believe this finding 
reveals an important underlying limitation of speech 
interfaces and presents a challenge for designers of speech 
interfaces. Users will experience a reduced sense of control 
over their environment when interacting via voice 
interfaces. Voice interfaces will feel less responsive and as 
a result users may experience a reduced sense of ownership 
or responsibility for the outcomes of their actions. Overall 
users will have a reduced sense that they are in charge of 
the system. In this context it is worth noting that the 
simplified speech interface used in our experiments allowed 
us to minimise recognition errors and latency. Therefore, 
even with continuing improvements in the technology 
underlying speech interfaces, the issue of a reduced sense of 
agency is likely to remain. 
An obvious question that arises from our results is: Why do 
speech interactions provide a diminished sense of agency as 
compared to keyboard interactions? We are not yet in a 
position to offer definitive answers to this question. 
However we can offer two possible explanations, both of 
which have implications for designers. 
One explanation from prior HCI research relates to the 
allocation of cognitive resources during tasks. It has been 
suggested that usability issues for speech interfaces are due 
to the fact that working memory is a cognitive resource that 
is shared between the processes of problem solving, recall 
and speech, and further that limb movements do not 
compete for the same cognitive resources [9]. This explains 
why humans find it difficult to speak and think at the same 
time, but can easily walk and talk simultaneously. This is 
interesting as recent research in cognitive neuroscience 
finds that increasing a person’s cognitive working memory 
load reduces their sense of agency [5]. An implication of 
this finding is that voice command interfaces should only 
be deployed with care in situations that have high cognitive 
working memory loads, but also require users to maintain a 
strong sense of control. 
An alternative explanation for a reduced sense of agency in 
speech interactions is based on a theory in cognitive 
neuroscience – cue integration. This theory holds that 
various cues surrounding actions and outcomes are 
integrated optimally and are weighted by their reliability to 
give rise to sense of agency [7]. This includes internal 
sensorimotor cues, e.g. proprioception, and contextual cues 
such as an intention to make a certain action. In [2] 
participants experienced significantly greater intentional 
binding for skin-based input than for keyboard input. The 
present study and [2] currently represent the only two 
investigations into agency and non-conventional input 
techniques. However from these we see a potential 
continuum arising. Skin-based input provides a greater 
sense of agency than keyboard input, which in turn provides 
a greater sense of agency than voice commands. It is 
possible that the graded degree of agency across these 
interfaces may be ascribed to the varying number of cues 
and/or the reliability of these cues. For speech interfaces the 
main agency cues available are auditory and proprioceptive. 
By comparison a keyboard offers a wider array of cues, 
including auditory, proprioceptive, visual and haptic. Over 
and above this, the skin-input modality provides further 
cues, through the body itself acting as the input device. 
This explanation of the reduced sense of agency in our 
speech interface is intriguing, as it also offers a possible 
solution for designers. It suggests that the sense of agency 
in speech interfaces – or indeed any input modality - could 
be improved by offering users increased contextual cues 
(e.g. haptic feedback) regarding their interactions. 
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